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International Labor Standards and 
Decent Work: Perspectives from the 
Developing World 
GARY S. FIELDS 
I. Introduction 
Billions of people in the world live in appalling conditions. The World Bank 
and the United Nations reckon that three billion people—nearly half of hu-
manity—subsist on less than U.S.$2.oo per person per day (after adjusting 
for differences in monetary units using Purchasing Power Parity adjust-
ments). The challenges of economic development are enormous. 
The theme of this conference, international labor standards, is one ap-
proach that is being taken to try to meet these development challenges.' I am 
and have been a strong supporter of those international labor standards that 
represent basic human rights in the workplace, not because of the economic 
effects that they would have (which, by the way, I think are positive) but 
simply because I believe they are right and that concerned world citizens 
should try to help the less fortunate among us (Fields, 1990, 1995, 2000).2 
Some kinds of work (slavery, indentured servitude, forced labor, the worst 
forms of child labor) are an outrage wherever in the world they occur, and 
they should be prohibited. Certain basic human rights in the workplace 
should, in my view, be guaranteed to workers—in particular, the right to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining. Like most other econo-
mists, I do not think that it is possible to pass laws or set standards to assure 
other important and sought-after conditions of work—most important, jobs 
themselves, earnings levels, and other conditions of employment. These, I 
believe, can best be achieved through rapid, broad-based economic growth, 
on which I have written elsewhere (Fields, 2001b). 
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It is a very positive development that the world community has now 
reached agreement on four core labor standards, described further below. 
The moral force of this agreement will help slow and possibly even reverse 
the infamous "race to the bottom"—for example, child labor in the carpet 
industries of India undermining Nepal's efforts to keep its carpet industry 
free of child labor (Hensman, 2000). 
Ironically, some of the loudest and most strident voices against interna-
tional labor standards come from the poorest parts of the world. My thesis in 
this chapter is that while some of the arguments being voiced against inter-
national labor standards have merit, others do not, and so I attempt to dif-
ferentiate the good from the less good positions. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses international labor 
standards as they were and Section III international labor standards as they 
are. Section IV reviews the positions of developing countries with regard to 
international labor standards. The conclusions are summed up in Section V. 
II. International Labor Standards: How It Was 
Responsibility for international labor standards has traditionally rested with 
the International Labour Organization (ILO). The ILO, founded in 1919, is 
the specialized agency of the United Nations which seeks to promote social 
justice and internationally recognized human and labor rights, thereby im-
proving the situation of human beings in the world of work (Report of the 
Director General, 1999, p. 5). The ILO's historical approach to improving 
workplace standards has been to promote conventions and recommenda-
tions for ratification by member countries. These conventions and recom-
mendations cover a wide range of labor standards, including respect of fun-
damental human rights, protection of wages, employment security, working 
conditions, labor market and social policies, and industrial relations. At pre-
sent, there are 184 conventions, 195 recommendations, and 175 member 
states. 
Ratification of labor standards is central to the ILO's work program. A 
past Director-General, Michel Hansenne, stated: "One of our major respon-
sibilities, therefore, is to ensure that, once adopted, standards are widely rati-
fied by States which solemnly pledge to apply them. We would be falling far 
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short of our claim to universality if we were to insist on the universality of 
standards as a matter of principle without taking the same trouble to make 
sure that they were universally implemented" (ILO, 1994, pp. 29-30). Simi-
larly, the current Director-General, Juan Somavia, has called for renewing 
the organization's work on labor standards by reinvigorating international 
labor standards, enhancing the ILO's work on standards, re-evaluating stan-
dard-setting, choosing suitable subjects for standards, and reassessing exist-
ing conventions (ILO, 1999). 
U.S. trade law has for many years maintained the importance of the fol-
lowing internationally recognized workers' rights:3 
Freedom of association 
The right to organize and bargain collectively 
Prohibition of forced or compulsory labor 
A minimum age for the employment of children 
Guarantee of acceptable working conditions (possibly including maxi-
mum hours of work per week, a weekly rest period, limits to work by 
young persons, a minimum wage, minimum workplace safety and 
health standards, and elimination of employment discrimination) 
Labor conditionally clauses are now attached to the Caribbean Basin Eco-
nomic Recovery Act (1983), the GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) 
program (1984), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (1985), the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (1987), Section 301 of the Omni-
bus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988), the Andean Trade Preference Act 
(1991), and Section 599 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (1992). 
In the case of the GSP program, the President is authorized to withhold rec-
ognition of a country that "has not taken or is not taking steps to afford in-
ternationally recognized worker rights to workers in the country (including 
any designated zone in that country)."4 In a dozen cases, GSP benefits have 
been withdrawn or suspended (USGAO, 1994; Van Liemt, 1989; Tsogas, 2001). 
Turning to other parts of the world, the Social Charter of the European 
Union, approved by all member nations except for Britain, specifies an even 
broader list of worker "rights": 
Freedom of movement 
The right to employment and remuneration 
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The improvement of living and working conditions 
The right to social protection 
The right to freedom of association and collective bargaining 
The right to vocational training 
The right of men and women to equal treatment 
The right of information, consultation, and participation 
The right to health and safety in the workplace 
The protection of children and adolescents in employment 
The protection of elderly persons 
The protection of persons with disabilities 
How well did these far-reaching attempts work? Not at all. Most countries 
could and did adopt what they wished and ignored what they didn't want. 
Take the United States as an example. Of the eight conventions that have 
been designated as fundamental, the United States has ratified precisely two. 
This does not mean that the United States is hostile to these standards or in-
different to them, but rather that it has found other ways to achieve its de-
sired labor standards. Indeed, in his chapter in this volume, Robert Flanagan 
presents detailed econometric evidence for the 1980s and 1990s showing that 
ratifications of labor standards made no statistically significant difference to 
labor rights and conditions, because these latter are improved by free trade 
policies and economic growth. 
III. International Labor Standards: How It Is 
In the mid-1990s, a sea change took place: the "try everything" approach to 
international labor standards was supplanted by a new, more focused posi-
tion at the ILO, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), and other international agencies.5 The World Summit on So-
cial Development held in 1995 in Copenhagen defined core labor standards 
as including the prohibition of forced labor and child labor, freedom of asso-
ciation and the right to organize and bargain collectively, equal remunera-
tion for men and women for work of equal value, and nondiscrimination in 
employment. What was important about the World Social Summit was not 
so much what was included but what wasn't: minimum wages, mandated 
fringe benefits, maximum hours of work, and the like. , 
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Another major milestone was a 1996 OECD study on international trade, 
employment, and labor standards (OECD, 1996). Two branches of the 
OECD that had often been working in conflict with each other—the Em-
ployment, Labour and Social Affairs Committee and the Trade Committee— 
agreed upon a set of core labor standards (freedom of association and the 
right to collective bargaining, elimination of exploitative forms of child la-
bor, the prohibition of forced labor, and nondiscrimination in employment) 
along with mechanisms to promote those standards worldwide.6 
The next important event was the December 1996 Singapore ministerial 
meeting of the World Trade Organization. The member states reiterated 
their commitment to internationally recognized core labor standards, sup-
ported collaboration between the WTO and ILO secretariats, rejected the use 
of labor standards for protectionist purposes, and recognized the ILO as the 
competent body for dealing with this issue. 
A truly defining moment for international labor standards was the June 
1998 International Labor Conference of the ILO, which approved the Decla-
ration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Because this docu-
ment is so important to present-day international labor standards, it is re-
produced in the appendix to this chapter. The declaration affirmed that all of 
the member states of the ILO have the responsibility to "promote and to re-
alize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution [of the ILO], the 
principles concerning the fundamental rights," which include: 
Freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining 
The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor 
The effective abolition of child labor 
The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occu-
pation 
What was so important was that these core labor standards did not have to 
be ratified; they were binding on the member countries of the ILO by virtue 
of the very fact of their membership in the organization. 
Since that time, these four core labor standards have been reaffirmed in a 
variety of fora. In 1999, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan integrated these 
four core labor standards into a nine-point Global Compact of shared values 
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and principles that has been endorsed by a wide range of business groups, 
individual companies, organized labor, and nongovernmental organizations. 
Then, in August 2000, the member nations of the OECD incorporated these 
core labor standards into revised Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. In 
its November 2001 Ministerial meeting at Doha, the WTO reaffirmed its 
support for core labor standards as laid out in the 1996 Singapore Ministerial. 
At that time, it also dropped all labor-related issues from its agenda, leaving 
those to the ILO. 
Alas, the international financial institutions—in particular, the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund but also the Asian Development 
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development 
Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development—have 
not endorsed or worked actively to support these core labor standards 
(OECD, 2000, pp. 57-59)/ The main reason for their reticence, apparently, is 
opposition to freedom of association and collective bargaining, because of 
the possible harmful effects that the exercise of these rights might have. 
These worries can, I submit, be largely overcome by setting up industrial re-
lations systems in ways that prescribe and proscribe what employers and 
unions must do, may do, and may not do. John Pencavel has written 
thoughtfully on this (Pencavel, 1997). The failure of the international finan-
cial institutions to back core labor standards is a real pity, both because of 
the implications of their nonsupport for workers in the developing world 
and because it opens up these organizations to criticism and protests, many 
of which could be avoided. 
Today, the ILO continues to advance core labor standards as a central part 
of its work program, which has now been reoriented toward the mission of 
"Decent Work for All." Under Director-General Juan Somavia, Decent 
Work aims not just to create jobs for women and men everywhere but also 
to create jobs of acceptable quality. The ILO aims to redress the so-called 
Decent Work Deficit by pursuing four strategic objectives: full employment, 
improved levels of socioeconomic security, universal respect for fundamen-
tal principles and rights at work, and the strengthening of social dialogue 
(ILO, 1999, 2001). Core labor standards fall under the "universal respect for 
fundamental principles and rights at work." The ILO's work program gives 
priority to these core standards over all others. 
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I regard Decent Work as a new and welcome redirection of the ILO's ef-
forts and have written more on this in Fields (2001a). Jobs in which core la-
bor standards are not honored cannot be regarded as decent. This is how I 
define indecent work: work under conditions so odious or harmful that it 
would be better for people not to work at all than to work under such dam-
aging conditions. In opposing indecent work defined in this way and seeking 
its elimination, I recognize that the alternative may not be pretty. What 
would happen to those who are displaced cannot' be ignored. If they move 
into the so-called informal sector and engage in street-vending, petty serv-
ices, family farming, or microenterprises, it is one thing. But if the alternative 
is prostitution, picking through garbage dumps, or worse, it is quite another. 
These fallback options vary from place to place; what they are must be rec-
ognized. 
Decent Work shifts the focus of the ILO to workplace outcomes: once 
core labor standards are satisfied, attention shifts to how much work there is, 
how remunerative and secure is the work, and under what conditions that 
work is carried out. These criteria raise a genuine development challenge: 
finding ways to increase employment and wages and pull labor market con-
ditions up through economic growth in order to improve the economic well-
being of people around the world and lessen poverty in the world. I urge the 
s ILO, the World Bank, and other national and international development in-
stitutions to form a genuine partnership centered on these objectives. 
IV. Developing Country Views on International Labor Standards: 
Perceptions and Reality 
If international labor standards might in fact lead to increased employment, 
higher earnings levels, and better workplace conditions for the working peo-
ple of the world, it would be expected that many of the stakeholders in the 
developing countries—the labor unions, unorganized workers, nongovern-
mental organizations, and government agencies—and their friends in the de-
veloped world would be enthusiastic supporters of standards. Indeed, there 
are many, many voices in both the developed and developing worlds that are 
supportive of international labor standards. It goes without saying that labor 
groups and human rights groups like the International Confederation of Free 
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Trade Unions, the International Labor Rights Fund, and the OECD's Trade 
Union Advisory Council support these standards. So too do some labor 
economists, a very visible and vocal example being Harvard's Richard Free-
man (1997). Then there are the former number two officials at the World 
Bank, Joseph Stiglitz (2000), and the International Monetary Fund, Stanley 
Fischer (2000). The list of supporters could go on at great length. 
The fact that international labor standards are favored by organized labor 
in the developed countries is often decried as "disguised protectionism" and 
not very well disguised protectionism at that. In the case of those labor un-
ions and labor ministries in the rich countries that aim to protect their inter-
ests against those of developing country workers, the claim of protectionism 
is a believable one. Sometimes, the protectionist motive is made explicit, as 
in the suggestion to "raise the cost of doing business in other nations 
through international organizing, international labor standards, and multi-
national bargaining campaigns" (Hecker and Hallock, 1991, p. 5) or as in the 
call by the President of the U.S. labor union UNITE (the Union of Needte-
trades, Industrial, and Textile Employees), Bruce Raynor, to "protect good 
union jobs in this country" (Raynor, 2001). Yet, it would surely be unfair to 
label all those who favor international labor standards (myself among them) 
as protectionist. In Richard Freeman's words, "Most advocates of standards 
want what they say they want: to guarantee as far as possible certain basic 
rights to workers around the world." 
There are, however, many opponents of international labor standards. 
The opposition takes two forms. Some oppose international labor standards 
per se. Others oppose linking labor standards to international trade. 
Let us start with the line of argument about standards per se. Many com-
panies believe that standards will hamper their ability to pursue business 
objectives. Their opposition to international labor standards comes as no 
surprise. 
Perhaps more surprising is that while most developing countries are on 
the record as supporting core labor standards, not all do. Here is a vivid and 
articulate statement of opposition to labor standards coming from Malaysia's 
Prime Minister: 
Western governments openly propose to eliminate the competitive edge of East 
Asia. The recent proposal for a world-wide minimum wage is a blatant example. 
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Westerners know that this is the sole comparative advantage of the developing 
countries. All other comparative advantages (technology, capital, rich domestic 
markets, legal frameworks, management and marketing networks) are with the 
developed states. It is obvious that professed concern about workers' welfare is 
motivated by selfish interest. Sanctimonious pronouncements on humanitarian, 
democratic and environmental issues are likely to be motivated by a similar self-
ish desire to put as many obstacles as possible in the way of anyone attempting to 
catch up and compete with the West. (Mahathir, 1994) 
And another by India's Commerce and Industry Minister, Murasoli Maran: 
The Western world, the industrialized world, wants to take away our comparative 
advantage. It is a pernicious way of robbing our comparative advantage. The de-
veloping countries consider it as a maneuver by wealthy nations to force our 
wages up, to undermine our competitiveness. This is the secret. (New York Times, 
December 17,1999) 
In both these cases, the argument concerns the effect of standards—in par-
ticular, the higher labor costs that they would engender. 
In essence, this is a stages-of-development argument. Many developing 
countries contend that poor labor standards are more a symptom of their 
lower level of economic development than any deliberate intent or design on 
their part. An example is a statement by Mr. Supachai Panitchpakdi of Thai-
land, the Director-General Designate of the WTO, who said: "Sanctions 
against bad labor practices will almost automatically hit smaller developing 
nations because they have had bad labor records due to poverty" (Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, December 8,1999). This argument makes sense if the 
"bad labor records" in question concern workers' earnings or other em-
ployment benefits. It makes much less sense in terms of internationally 
agreed core labor standards. As an Indian labor activist, Sujata Gothoskar of 
Bombay, stated: "With this argument, every struggle by the workers for a 
better life may be argued as eroding the competitive advantage of our coun-
try. Does this not negate the rationale and existence of the trade unions 
themselves?" (cited in Hensman, 2000). 
The stages-of-development argument comes up in another form. Some 
developing countries argue that given their lower stage of economic devel-
opment, the rapid economic transformations many are currently undergo-
ing, and the high degree of informality in their labor markets, it would not 
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be appropriate to apply such aspects of labor rights as are found in Europe— 
in particular, union representation on boards and other aspects of the Euro-
pean model of labor relations (Salazar-Xirinachs, 1999). Here too, we have an 
objection that is based on something other than core labor standards: the 
core labor standards concerning freedom of association and collective bar-
gaining do not provide for union membership on boards of companies, 
works councils, or anything else. 
Moving from standards to ways of achieving them, we come to the ques-
tion of the linkage of trade and labor standards—in particular, the question 
of trade sanctions for countries that do not abide by internationally agreed 
labor standards. Many developing country governments fear that if such a 
linkage is established, their access to world markets may be jeopardized, 
which, it might be said, is protectionist in its own way. Among the consistent 
critics of such linkages are the governments of such leading developing 
countries as India, China, Malaysia, South Africa, Brazil, and Mexico, and 
the member states of the Association of South-East Asian Nations, the South 
Asian trade ministers, an association of African nations, the Rio Group of 
Latin American Nations, and the Organization of American States. For ex-
ample, India "has all along maintained that it is not against core labor stan-
dards in itself, but opposed to its abuse for trade purposes to deny market 
access to exports from developing countries" ("EU Backtracks," 2000). 
At the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle in 1999, more than one hun-
dred WTO members from the developing world opposed international labor 
standards, saying that they can't afford them. As the New York Times noted 
editorially at the time (December 3, 1999), "There is no easy resolution of 
this issue, because member nations do not agree on what labor rights provi-
sions should be set." Since then, the so-called G-15 of developing countries 
has been formed (members include Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, 
Sri Lanka, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe). This organization has come out 
strongly against linking core labor standards (and also environmental stan-
dards) to global trade. 
On this issue of trade sanctions, the debate is strong on both sides.8 In my 
judgment, there is a valid reason to worry about trade sanctions and a valid 
reason not to. The valid reason to worry is that U.S. law still carries the pos-
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sibility of unilateral trade sanctions against countries that-are judged (by the 
United States) to have engaged in an unfair trade practice (against the United 
States). A reason not to worry is that multilateral trade sanctions are effec-
tively off the table. Let me say a bit about each. 
First, on unilateral trade sanctions, U.S. law contains a provision known 
popularly as "Super 301," after the section of the U.S. Trade Code to which it 
refers. Since 1988, "denial of internationally recognized worker rights" has 
been included among the list of unfair trade practices. For this purpose, the 
"internationally recognized worker rights" include a "guarantee of acceptable 
working conditions" including minimum wages, hours of work, and the like. 
Developing countries are right to be concerned. After all, if tariffs can be im-
posed unilaterally on imported steel under Section 203 of the Trade Act, as 
they just were in recent months, what is to prevent the United States from 
withdrawing GSP benefits from developing countries or imposing other pen-
alties on them under Section 301 of the same act? Jagdish Bhagwati (1995, 
1998), Arvind Panagariya (2000), and T. N. Srinivasan (1998) are among the 
highly vocal critics of the possibility of trade sanctions in U.S. law. 
On the other hand, on the issue of multilateral trade sanctions, the devel-
oping countries need not worry. The simple fact is that labor standards are 
not now subject to the rules and disciplines imposed by the world's trading 
organization, the WTO, and are not likely to be. Although some nations in 
Europe and North America favor such a linkage, most other countries do not 
(including, it might be added, the European Union itself).9 The WTO's offi-
cial website sums up the present situation thus: 
Most developing countries and many developed nations believe the issue of core 
labour standards does not belong in the WTO. These member governments see 
the issue of trade and labour standards as a guise for protectionism in developed-
country markets. Developing-country officials have said that efforts to bring la-
bour standards into the WTO represent a smokescreen for undermining the 
comparative advantage of lower-wage developing countries. Many officials in de-
veloping countries argue that better working conditions and improved labour 
rights arise through economic growth. They say that if the issue of core labour 
standards became enforceable under WTO rules, any sanctions imposed against 
countries with lower labour standards would merely perpetuate poverty and de-
lay improvements in workplace standards. (WTO, 2002) 
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The WTO has not budged from the position it took when it was first created 
in 1996: that matters of labor standards are best left to the ILO and are out-
side the purview of the WTO. 
Developing countries complain that linking labor standards to trade may 
be a slippery slope, leading only to further demands from developed coun-
tries in the future. Many developing countries, such as India and Brazil, op-
pose even discussing labor standards within the WTO, because it would be a 
step toward empowering the WTO to impose sanctions against countries 
that do not enforce prescribed labor standards. These countries worry that 
by bringing labor standards and other issues such as environment into the 
WTO, the organization may be overloaded, thereby being rendered incapa-
ble of concentrating on its core mission of liberalizing the world trading 
system, from which these countries hope to benefit through increased mar-
ket access. 
Returning to the concern of developed countries to get developing coun-
tries to do what we want them to do in the area of labor standards, a more 
practical approach would be to tie trade agreements with us to the commit-
ment by developing countries to enforce their own labor laws. This was done 
in the case of the recently concluded trade treaty between the United States 
and Jordan and applies to pending agreements with Chile and Singapore. In 
other situations, the problem of low labor standards in developing countries 
is in part one of institutional deficiency rather than any lack of desire to see 
the standards implemented. Enforcement is itself costly, both in terms of 
scarce administrative capabilities and in terms of scarce financial resources. 
It is worth noting in this context that under some interpretations of interna-
tional law, abridgement of rights including labor rights is acceptable if satis-
fying the right is too expensive. We can and should be more generous with 
foreign aid to help bring about such improvements. 
V. Conclusion 
First, the old approach to international labor standards involved setting 
some 184 standards, which the ILO encouraged its 175 member countries 
around the world to adopt. The United States itself has tried to impose labor 
standards on its trading partners by threatening trade sanctions against those 
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trading partners who failed to adhere to the prescribed standards. These 
measures were viewed, justifiably, as protectionist by developing and devel-
oped countries alike. 
Second, after a long debate, world opinion has coalesced around the need 
for and desirability of core labor standards in four areas: freedom of associa-
tion and effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimi-
nation of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, the effective abolition of 
child labor, and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment 
and occupation. Employer, worker, and government representatives in the 
ILO have issued a Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, according to which acceptance of these standards is binding on the 
countries of the world by virtue of their membership in the ILO with no 
ratifications or further action being required. With these core labor stan-
dards as base, the ILO has launched a "Decent Work" agenda aimed at se-
curing decent work for women and men everywhere. 
Third, many developing countries continue to oppose international labor 
standards. Their principal points of opposition include losing their com-
parative advantage, losing the benefits of free trade, and the inappropriate-
ness of imposing demanding standards at their current stage of development. 
While some of their concerns are warranted, other of these arguments fail to 
stand up to scrutiny, either because the arguments themselves are not well 
reasoned or because they reflect a misunderstanding of what core labor stan-
dards they are now being asked to abide by. It would appear, therefore, that 
to an important degree, developing countries' opposition to international la-
bor standards comes more from what was being proposed than from what is 
now on the table. Those in the international community who support more 
widespread labor standards would do well to avoid such shorthands as 
"internationally recognized labor standards," "worker rights," and the like 
and instead discuss "the four core labor standards" in general or one of the 
four in particular. 
In Conclusion, then, should the developing countries have labor standards 
that are different from Western or international standards? My answer is, yes 
and no. The core labor standards discussed in this paper—including freedom 
of association and collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of 
forced or compulsory labor, the effective abolition of child labor, and the 
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elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and o ccu p a t i o n -
are fundamental human rights in the workplace. They should be honored in 
the developing countries the same as elsewhere. On the other hand, as a 
practical matter, certain important labor standards-—in particular, earnings 
levels but also minimum wages, maximum hours of work, mandated fringe 
benefits, occupational safety and health regulations, and the like—must be 
allowed to differ across countries. These latter standards should be deter-
mined within countries and not by international mandate. 
The developing countries are right in opposing the imposition of stan-
dards regarding earnings, hours, benefits, or safety and health before labor 
market conditions warrant. But such mandates have all but disappeared 
from serious policy discussion at present, and therefore many arguments 
now being voiced against labor standards are simply irrelevant. What is rele-
vant is the appallingly high rates of unemployment and underemployment, 
low levels of earnings, high rates of poverty, and appalling standards of living 
of literally billions of people in the world. How to achieve economic growth 
of a type that will remedy these conditions is a matter of great international 
urgency. 
Appendix: ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work 
86th Session, Geneva, June 1998 
Whereas the ILO was founded in the conviction that social justice is essential to 
universal and lasting peace; 
Whereas economic growth is essential but not sufficient to ensure equity, social 
progress and the eradication of poverty, confirming the need for the ILO to promote 
strong social policies, justice and democratic institutions; 
Whereas the ILO should, now more than ever, draw upon all its standard-setting, 
technical cooperation and research resources in all its areas of competence, in par-
ticular employment, vocational training and working conditions, to ensure that, in 
the context of a global strategy for economic and social development, economic and 
social policies are mutually reinforcing components in order to create broad-based 
sustainable development; 
Whereas the ILO should give special attention to the problems of persons with 
special social needs, particularly the unemployed and migrant workers, and mobilize 
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and encourage international, regional and national efforts aimed at resolving their 
problems, and promote effective policies aimed at job creation; 
Whereas, in seeking to maintain the link between social progress and economic 
growth, the guarantee of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work is of particular 
significance in that it enables the persons concerned, to claim freely and on the basis 
of equality of opportunity, their fair share of the wealth which they have helped to 
generate, and to achieve fully their human potential; 
Whereas the ILO is the constitutionally mandated international organization and 
the competent body to set and deal with international labour standards, and enjoys 
universal support and acknowledgement in promoting Fundamental Rights at Work 
as the expression of its constitutional principles; 
Whereas it is urgent, in a situation of growing economic interdependence, to re-
affirm the immutable nature of the Fundamental Principles and Rights embodied in 
the Constitution of the Organization and to promote their universal application; 
The International Labour Conference 
1. Recalls: 
(a) that in freely joining the ILO, all Members have endorsed the principles and 
rights set out in its Constitution and in the Declaration of Philadelphia, and have 
undertaken to work towards attaining the overall objectives of the Organization to 
the best of their resources and fully in line with their specific circumstances; 
(b) that these principles and rights have been expressed and developed in the 
form of specific rights and obligations in Conventions recognized as fundamental 
both inside and outside the Organization. 
2. Declares that all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in 
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organi-
zation to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the 
Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject 
of those Conventions, namely: 
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining; 
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; 
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and 
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
3. Recognizes the obligation on the Organization to assist its Members, in re-
sponse to their established and expressed needs, in order to attain these objectives by 
making full use of its constitutional, operational and budgetary resources, including, 
by the mobilization of external resources and support, as well as by encouraging 
other international organizations with which the ILO has established relations, pur-
suant to article 12 of its Constitution, to support these efforts: 
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(a) by offering technical cooperation and advisory services to promote the ratifi-
cation and implementation of the fundamental Conventions; 
(b) by assisting those Members not yet in a position to ratify some or all of these 
Conventions in their efforts to respect, to promote and to realize the principles con-
cerning fundamental rights which are the subject of these Conventions; and 
(c) by helping the Members in their efforts to create a climate for economic and 
social development. 
4. Decides that, to give full effect to this Declaration, a promotional follow-up, 
which is meaningful and effective, shall be implemented in accordance with the 
measures specified in the annex hereto, which shall be considered as an integral part 
of this Declaration. 
5. Stresses that labour standards should not be used for protectionist trade pur-
poses, and that nothing in this Declaration and its follow-up shall be invoked or oth-
erwise used for such purposes; in addition, the comparative advantage of any coun-
try should in no way be called into question by this Declaration and its follow-up. 
Notes 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on International 
Labor Standards, Stanford Law School, May 2002.1 am very pleased to acknowledge 
the helpful contributions of Puja Gupta and Dhushyanth Raju to this paper, as well 
as insightful comments by Robert Flanagan, William Gould, Arvind Subramanian, 
and Kenneth Swinnerton. 
1. Another approach is broad-based economic growth, on which I have also 
been working for a long time. For a summary, see Fields (2001b). 
2. See also the discussions by Leary (1996) and Swinnerton (1997). 
3. See, for example, Lyle (1991), Reich (1994), and Tsogas (2001). 
4. At the time that this paper is being written, that particular provision has 
lapsed, but it is likely to be renewed shortly. 
5. Many in the trade union movement and their supporters regard this as a dan-
gerous basket to put all one's eggs in (Turner, Katz, and Hurd, 2001; Compa, 2002). 
6. Trade sanctions were mentioned but were neither approved nor disapproved. 
7. The World Bank, for instance, states: "There is a case for international con-
cern over core standards"—hardly a ringing endorsement (World Bank, 1995, p. 6). 
8. For an eloquent statement in favor of linkage, see Hensman (2000). For an 
eloquent statement opposed, see Bhagwati (2001). 
9. According to Pascal Lamy, the European Commissioner for Trade, "We do 
not want sanctions. I repeat we do not want sanctions here. We differ from the USA 
on the issue of core labor standards" (The Statesman, Mar. 6, 2000). 
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